## CYCLIC ROUTING IN STRUCTURED PEER-TO-PEER NETWORKS

DMITRY KORZUN AND ANDREI GURTOV

Petrozavodsk State University Helsinki Institute for Information Technology

AMICT 2008 seminar 20.05.2008

## **Typical P2P routing**

- P2P network of N nodes
- Node s maintains a routing table  $T_s = \{(u, IP_u)\}$  (all outgoing links of s)
- Node s forwards messages to u via the underlying IP network:  $s \xrightarrow{IP_u} u$
- The choice of appropriate  $u \in T_s$  depends on P2P routing protocol (e.g., Chord, Tapestry, Pastry, ...)
- Distance between current and destination nodes becomes progressively closer

A limited (local) view to the network.



## Motivation

- Ideally a peer may contact any peer
- Practice, however, it is not so easy

#### **Problems:**

- Restricted access to IP addresses
  - non-transitive connectivity
    - $u \to w, w \to u,$ but  $u \not\to v$
  - node u and v are NAT-separated
  - node u does not provide  $IP_u$  to v
- Malicious nodes

dropping packets, incorrect data

#### **Goals:**

- Extending P2P routing
- More dependability and security
- Preserving efficiency

## **Related P2P strategies**

#### **Look-ahead** in $u \to^+ d$

- One level of look-ahead (or neighbor's neighbor)
  u → {v<sub>1</sub>,..., v<sub>n</sub>} and v<sub>i</sub> → {w<sub>i1</sub>,..., w<sub>im</sub>}
  the best next hop v = v<sub>k</sub> is selected depending on {w<sub>11</sub>,..., w<sub>nm</sub>}
- In general, u should select  $v = v_k$  depending on the remaining path

### Flexible routing table maintenance

- Size  $|T_u|$  is not limited by P2P protocol but only by node capacity
- Also  $|T_u|$  is independent on other nodes

### **Multipath routing**

- Having many neighbors in  $T_u$ , u can use some of them in parallel
- Each of these neighbors start an alternate path

### Cycles

- When s and d communicate they use a cycle
  - $s \to^+ d \to^+ s$



 More information (intermediate nodes)

$$s \to^+ c_2 \to^+ \cdots \to^+ c_{n-1} \to^+ s$$

$$C_{2} \rightarrow + C_{3}$$

$$C_{3}$$

$$C_$$

• In addition to  $T_s$ , node s maintains  $C_s = \{C_1, \dots, C_q\},$ where  $C_l = (s; c_{l1}, c_{l2}, \dots)$ 

# **Cyclic routing algorithm**

**Require:** Message p (traveling from s to d) arrives to  $u \neq d$ . The node u maintains routing table  $T_u$  and cyclic structure  $C_u$ .

Find  $c \in C_u$  such that  $c = (u \to v_1 \to^+ \cdots \to^+ \widetilde{d} \to^+ \cdots \to^+ v_n \to^+ u)$  where  $\widetilde{d}$  is close to d; if c is found then

Let  $v_1$  be the next-hop node v;

#### else

Find the next-hop node  $v \in T_u$  according to the underlying DHT; end if

Forward p to v;

## **Global and local routing**

#### • Global

Routing to an area where responsible nodes lie

• Local

Being in neighborhood, routing to a destination

• Cyclic routing is global while underlying P2P routing is local





## **Routes around malicious nodes**

Lookup-based cycle construction (passive)

- 1. lookup for key leads to path  $s \to^+ d$
- 2. acknowledgment,  $d \rightarrow^+ s$
- 3. cycle is stored in  $C_s$

- Successful routes are stored to be reused
- No need for intermediate nodes to provide their IPs
- More security can be added, e.g., cryptography
- Trustworthy paths



# **Skipping dense areas**

Chord DHT produces insecure routes (many nodes in small area)

- Constructing cycle  $s \to^+ d \to^+ s$
- Remove closely related nodes (dense area)
- Nodes u and v are allowed to find a new path to d and s, respectively
- Changing a cycle

1
high density,
insecure
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
d
u u

# Changing a cycle

- A cycle provides a path to transfer a packet
  - Fig.(a): nodes do not change the path selecting the same (or close) cycle C
  - Fig.(b): node u changes the path selecting cycle  $C' = (u \rightarrow v \rightarrow^+ w \rightarrow^+ d \rightarrow^+ u)$
- It can lead to loops, Fig.(b)
- Chord allows loop-free routing
- A way to modify/repair a cycle initially set by a lookup source



# **Opportunistic routing**

- In pure Chord, the predecessor of a destination node is a point of failure, Fig.(a)
- Let a lookup jump over the primary destination, when replication is in use (DHash by Dabek et al.)
- Stop whenever  $nodeID \le key$
- Hopefully we are still in replication area, Fig.(b)
- Estimate in advance:

 $[\texttt{key},\texttt{key} + r \times D_{\text{avg}}],$  where r is #replicas,  $D_{\text{avg}}$  is the average distance between sequential nodes

More conservatively  $[\text{key}, \text{key} + 1/2 \times r \times D_{\text{avg}}]$ 





## **Simulation (together with Boris Nechaev)**

### CR-Chord = Chord + CyclicRouting

• <u>Goal</u>:

Find out how cyclic routing helps to mitigate malicious attacks (better lookup availability)

- Assumptions:
  - Malicious nodes drop lookup packets, but reply to ping
  - Only good nodes generate lookups and are responsible for documents
  - Currently static environment
  - Instant attack (G good nodes, M malicious nodes, N = G + M)

### Results

- Chord is not well resistant to presence of malicious nodes
- CR-Chord increases lookup availability
- Note that no IP restrictions were in the simulation



## **Future work**

### **Cyclic routing:**

- Enhancing cycles construction/transformation
- Opportunistic routing
- $C_s$  evolution (cycles insertion, transformation, removal)
- Finger tables maintenance using cycles

### Simulation:

- More intelligent malious nodes and attack scenarios
- IP providing policy (trust)
- Cycles in dynamic environment

### **THANK YOU!**

### **QUESTIONS?**